A Maximum Principle for Markov Regime-Switching Forward Backward
  Stochastic Differential Games and Applications by Pamen, Olivier Menoukeu & Momeya, Romual Herve
ar
X
iv
:1
40
3.
29
00
v2
  [
ma
th.
OC
]  
13
 O
ct 
20
14
A MAXIMUM PRINCIPLE FOR MARKOV REGIME-SWITCHING
FORWARD-BACKWARD STOCHASTIC DIFFERENTIAL GAMES AND
APPLICATIONS
OLIVIER MENOUKEU-PAMEN AND ROMUALD HERVE´ MOMEYA
Abstract. In this paper, we present an optimal control problem for stochastic differential
games under Markov regime-switching forward-backward stochastic differential equations
with jumps. First, we prove a sufficient maximum principle for non zero-sum stochastic
differential game problems and obtain equilibrium point for such games. Second, we prove an
equivalent maximum principle for non zero-sum stochastic differential games. The zero-sum
stochastic differential games equivalent maximum principle is then obtained as a corollary.
We apply the obtained results to study a problem of robust utility maximization under a
relative entropy penalty. We also apply the results to find optimal investment of an insurance
firm under model uncertainty.
1. Introduction
The expected utility theory can be seen as the theory of decision making under uncertainty
based on some postulates of agent’s preferences. In general, the agent’s preference is driven
by a time-additive functional and a constant rate discount future reward. The standard
expected utility maximization problem supposes that the agent knows the initial probability
measure that governs the dynamic of the underlying. However, it is difficult or even impossible
to find an individual worthwhile probability distribution of the uncertainty. Moreover, in
finance and insurance, there is no conformism on which original probability should be used
to model uncertainty. This led to the study of utility maximization under model uncertainty,
the uncertainty here, being represented by a family of absolute continuous (or equivalent)
probability distribution. The idea is to solve the problem for each distribution belonging to
the above mentioned class and choose the one that gives the worst objective value. More
specifically, the investor maximizes the expected utility with respect to each measure in this
class, and chooses among all, the portfolio with the lowest value. This is also called a robust
optimization problem and has been intensively studied the past years. For more information,
the reader may consult [1, 8, 10, 12, 15, 16] and references therein.
Stochastic control problem for Markovian regime-switching model has received a lot of
attention recently; See e.g., [4, 5, 13, 14, 19, 21]. Each state of the Markov chain represents
a state of an economy. Hence, one can include structural changes in economic conditions of
the state process. In this paper, we study an optimal control problem of recursive utility for
Markov regime-switching jump-diffusion process under model uncertainty. Let mention that
the notion of recursive utility was introduced in discrete time in [9, 20], to untie the concepts
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of risk aversion and intertemporal substitution aversion which are not treated independently
in the standard utility formulation. This concept was extended to continuous time in [6]
and called stochastic differential utility (SDU). The performance functional in our stochastic
differential utility case can be represented as the solution of controlled Markov-switching
backward stochastic differential equation (BSDE). As pointed above, the agent seeks the
strategy which maximizes the value functional in the worst possible choice of probability
distribution. In fact, it is assumed that the mean relative growth rate of the risky asset is not
known to the agent, but subject to uncertainty, hence it can be regarded as a stochastic control
which plays against the agent. This problem can be seeing as a Markov switching (zero-sum)
stochastic differential game between the agent and the market. Such a problem was studied
in [8], where the authors introduced a model to discuss an optimal investment problem of an
insurance company using a game theoretic approach. The objective of the insurance company
being to choose an optimal investment strategy so as to maximize the expected exponential
utility of terminal wealth in the worst-case scenario. Their model is general enough to include
financial risk, economic risk, insurance risk, and model risk. The stock prices dynamics, the
interest rate and the aggregate insurance claim process are modulated by a Markov chain.
The authors used the dynamic programming approach to solve the problem and derive explicit
solutions. In this paper, we instead use an approach based on stochastic maximum principle,
and generalize their results to the framework of (nonzero-sum) forward-backward stochastic
differential games and also more general dynamics for the state process. We also obtain
explicit formulas for the optimal strategies of the market and the insurance company, when
the utility is of exponential type and the Markov chain has two states. It is worth mentioning
that, unlike in [8], in our derivation of the closed forms solutions, we do not assume that the
interest rate is zero.
Our paper is also motivated by the idea developed in [15, 14, 16], where the authors derive
a general maximum principle for forward-backward stochastic differential games, stochastic
differential games with delay and Markov regime-switching stochastic control with partial
information, respectively. One important advantage of our approach is that we may relax
the assumption of concavity on our Hamiltonian. We derive a general maximum principle for
forward-backward Markov regime-switching stochastic differential under model uncertainty.
Using this result, we study a problem of recursive utility maximization with entropy penalty.
We show that the optimal solution is the unique solution to a quadratic Markov switching
backward stochastic differential equation. This result extend the results in [1, 12] by con-
sidering a Markov regime-switching state process, and more general stochastic differential
utility.
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we formulate our control
problem. In Section 3, we derive a partial information stochastic maximum principle for for-
ward backward stochastic differential game for a Markov switching Le´vy process under model
uncertainty. In Section 4, we apply our results to study first a robust utility maximization
with entropy penalty and second a problem of optimal investment of an insurance company
under model uncertainty. In the latter case, explicit expressions for optimal strategies are
derived.
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2. Model and Problem Formulation
In this section, we formulate the general problem of stochastic differential games of Markov
regime-switching forward-backward SDEs. Let (Ω,F , P ) be a complete probability space,
where P is a reference probability measure.
Let α := {α(t)}0≤t≤T be an irreducible homogeneous continuous-time Markov chain with
a finite state space S = {e1, e2, . . . , eD} ⊂ R
D, where D ∈ N, and the jth component of en is
the Kronecker delta δnj for each n, j = 1, . . . ,D. Denote by Λ := {λnj : 1 ≤ n, j ≤ D} the
rate (or intensity) matrix of the Markov chain under P . Hence, for each 1 ≤ n, j ≤ D, λnj
is the transition intensity of the chain from state en to state ej at time t. Recall that for
n 6= j, λnj ≥ 0 and
∑D
j=1 λnj = 0, hence λnn ≤ 0. It was shown in [7] that α admits the
following semimartingale representation
α(t) = α(0) +
∫ t
0
ΛTα(s)ds +M(t), (2.1)
whereM := {M(t)}t∈[0,T ] is a R
D-valued martingale under the measure P with respect to the
filtration generated by α and ΛT denotes the transpose of a matrix. For each 1 ≤ n, j ≤ D,
with n 6= j, and t ∈ [0, T ], denote by Jnj(t) the number of jumps from state en to state ej up
to time t. It can be shown (see [7]) that
Jnj(t) = λnj
∫ t
0
〈α(s−), en〉ds+mnj(t), (2.2)
where mnj := {mnj(t)}t∈[0,T ] with mnj(t) :=
∫ t
0 〈α(s−), en〉〈dM(s), ej〉 is a martingale under
the measure P with respect to the filtration generated by α.
Fix j ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,D}, denote by Φj(t) the number of jumps into state ej up to time t. Then
Φj(t) :=
D∑
n=1,n 6=j
Jnj(t) =
D∑
n=1,n 6=j
λnj
∫ t
0
〈α(s−), en〉ds+ Φ˜j(t)
= λj(t) + Φ˜j(t), (2.3)
with Φ˜j(t) =
∑D
n=1,n 6=jmnj(t) and λj(t) =
∑D
n=1,n 6=j λnj
∫ t
0 〈α(s−), en〉ds. Note that, for each
j ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,D}, Φ˜j := {Φ˜j(t)}t∈[0,T ] is a martingale under the measure P with respect to
the filtration generated by α.
Let B = {B(t)}0≤t≤T be a Brownian motion and N˜α(dt,dz) := N(dζ,ds)−να(dζ) ds be an
independent compensated Markov regime-switching Poisson random measure with να(dζ) ds,
the compensator (or dual predictable projection) of N , defined by:
να(dζ)dt :=
D∑
j=1
〈α(t−), ej〉νj(dζ)dt. (2.4)
For each j ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,D}, νj(dζ) is the conditional density of the jump size when the Markov
chain α is in state ej and satisfies
∫
R0
min(1, ζ2)νj(dζ) <∞, where R0 = R\{0}.
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Suppose that the state process X(t) = X(u)(t, ω); 0 ≤ t ≤ T, ω ∈ Ω, is a controlled Markov
regime-switching jump-diffusion process of the form

dX(t) = b(t,X(t), α(t), u(t), ω) dt + σ(t,X(t), α(t), u(t), ω) dB(t)
+
∫
R0
γ(t,X(t), α(t), u(t), ζ, ω) N˜α(dζ,dt)
+η(t,X(t), α(t), u(t), ω) · dΦ˜(t), t ∈ [0, T ],
X(0) = x0.
(2.5)
We suppose that F = {Ft}0≤t≤T is the P -augmentation of the natural filtration associated
with B, N and α. In our model, u = (u1, u2), with ui being the control of player i; i = 1, 2.
We suppose that the different levels of information available at time t to the player i; i = 1, 2
are modelled by two subfiltrations
E
(i)
t ⊂ Ft ; t ∈ [0, T ]. (2.6)
Denote by Ai the set of admissible control of player i, contained in the set of E
(i)
t -predictable
processes; i = 1, 2, with value in Ai ⊂ R.
The functions b, σ, γ and η are given such that for all t, b(t, x, en, u, ·), σ(t, x, en, u, ·),
γ(t, x, en, u, ζ, ·) and η(t, x, en, u, ·), n = 1, . . . ,D are Ft- progressively measurable for all
x ∈ R, u ∈ A1 × A2 and ζ ∈ R0 and (2.5) has a unique strong solution for any admissible
control u ∈ A1 × A2 .
We consider the associated BSDE’s in the unknowns
(
Yi(t), Zi(t),Ki(t, ζ), Vi(t)
)
of the
form

dYi(t) = −gi(t,X(t), α(t), Yi(t), Zi(t),Ki(t, ·), Vi(t), u(t)) dt + Zi(t) dB(t)
+
∫
R0
Ki(t, ζ) N˜α(dζ,dt) + Vi(t) · dΦ˜(t); t ∈ [0, T ],
Yi(T ) = hi(X(T ), α(T )) ; i = 1, 2.
(2.7)
Here gi : [0, T ]×R×S×R×R×R×R×A1×A2 → R and h : R×S→ R are such that the BSDE
(2.7) has a unique solution for any admissible control u ∈ A1 × A2. For sufficient conditions
for existence and uniqueness of Markov regime-switching BSDEs, we refer the reader to [2]
or [3] and references therein.
Let fi : [0, T ] × R × S × A1 × A2 → R, ϕi : R × S → R and ψi : R → R, i = 1, 2 be given
C1 functions with respect to their arguments and ψ′i(x) ≥ 0, for all x, i = 1, 2. Assume that
the performance functional for each player i, i = 1, 2 is as follows
Ji(t, u) := E
[ ∫ T
t
fi(s,X(s), α(s), u(s)) ds + ϕi(X(T ), α(T )) + ψi(Yi(t))
∣∣∣E(i)t ]; i = 1, 2.
(2.8)
Here, fi, ϕi and ψi may be seen as profit rates, bequest functions and “utility evaluations”
respectively, of the player i; i = 1, 2. For t = 0, we put
Ji(u) := Ji(0, u), i = 1, 2. (2.9)
We shall consider the non-zero sum stochastic differential game problem, that is, we analyze
the following:
Problem 2.1. Find (u∗1, u
∗
2) ∈ A1 ×A2 (if it exists) such that
(1) J1(t, u1, u
∗
2) ≤ J1(t, u
∗
1, u
∗
2) for all u1 ∈ A1,
(2) J2(t, u
∗
1, u2) ≤ J2(t, u
∗
1, u
∗
2) for all u2 ∈ A2.
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If it exists, we call such a pair (u∗1, u
∗
2) a Nash Equilibrium. This intuitively means that while
player I controls u1, player II controls u2. We assume that each player knows the equilibrium
strategies of the other player and does not gain anything by changing his strategy unilaterally.
If each player is making the best decision she can, based on the other player’s decision, then
we say that the two players are in Nash Equilibrium.
3. A stochastic maximum principle for Markov regime-switching
forward-backward stochastic differential games
In this section, we shall find the Nash equilibrium for Problem 2.1 based on a stochastic
maximum principle for Markov regime-switching forward-backward differential equation.
Define the Hamiltonians
Hi : [0, T ]× R× S× R× R×R× R× A1 × A2 ×R× R× R×R× R −→ R,
by
Hi (t, x, en, y, z, k, v, u1, u2, a, p, q, r(·), w)
:=fi(t, x, en, u1, u2) + agi(t, x, en, y, z, k, v, u1, u2) + pib(t, x, en, u1, u2)
+ qiσ(t, x, en, u1, u2) +
∫
R0
ri(ζ)γ(t, x, en, u1, u2, ζ)να(dζ)
+
D∑
j=1
ηj(t, x, en, u1, u2)w
j
n(t)λnj , i = 1, 2 (3.1)
where R denote the set of all functions k : [0, T ] × R0 → R for which the integral in (3.1)
converges. An example of such set is the set L2(να). We suppose that Hi, i = 1, 2 is Fre´chet
differentiable in the variables x, y, z, k, v, u and that ∇kHi(t, ζ), i = 1, 2 is a random measure
which is absolutely continuous with respect to ν. Next, we define the associated adjoint
process Ai(t), pi(t), qi(t), ri(t, ·) and wi(t), t ∈ [0, T ] and ζ ∈ R by the following forward-
backward SDE
(1) The Markovian regime-switching forward SDE in Ai(t); i = 1, 2

dAi(t) =
∂Hi
∂y
(t) dt+
∂Hi
∂z
(t)dB(t) +
∫
R0
d∇kHi
dν(ζ)
(t, ζ) N˜α(dζ,dt)
+∇vHi(t) · dΦ˜(t); t ∈ [0, T ],
Ai(0) = ψ
′
i(Y (0)).
(3.2)
Here and in what follows, we use the notation
∂Hi
∂y
(t) =
∂Hi
∂y
(t,X(t), α(t), u1(t), u2(t), Yi(t), Zi(t),Ki(t, ·), Vi(t), Ai(t), pi(t), qi(t), ri(t, ·), wi(t)),
etc,
d∇kHi
dν(ζ)
(t, ζ) is the Radon-Nikodym derivative of ∇kHi(t, ζ) with respect to ν(ζ)
and ∇vHi(t) · dΦ˜(t) =
∑D
j=1
∂Hi
∂vj
(t)dΦ˜j(t) with V
j
i = Vi(t, ej).
6 OLIVIER MENOUKEU-PAMEN AND ROMUALD HERVE´ MOMEYA
(2) The Markovian regime-switching BSDE in (pi(t), qi(t), ri(t, ·), wi(t)); i = 1, 2

dpi(t) = −
∂Hi
∂x
(t)dt+ qi(t) dB(t) +
∫
R0
ri(t, ζ) N˜α(dζ,dt)
+wi(t) · dΦ˜i(t); t ∈ [0, T ],
pi(T ) =
∂ϕi
∂x
(X(T ), α(T )) +Ai(T )
∂hi
∂x
(X(T ), α(T )).
(3.3)
3.1. A sufficient maximum principle. In what follows, we give the sufficient maximum
principle.
Theorem 3.1 (Sufficient maximum principle for Regime-switching FB-
SDE games). Let (û1, û2) ∈ A1 × A2 with corresponding solutions
X̂(t), (Ŷi(t), Ẑi(t), K̂i(t, ζ), V̂i(t)), Âi(t), (p̂i(t), q̂i(t), r̂i(t, ζ), ŵi(t)) of (2.5), (2.7), (3.2)
and (3.3) respectively for i = 1, 2. Suppose that the following holds:
(1) The functions
x 7→ hi(x, en), x 7→ ϕi(x, en), y 7→ ψi(y), (3.4)
are concave for i = 1, 2.
(2) The functions
H˜1(t, x, en, y, z, k, v)
=ess sup
µ1∈A1
E
[
H1(t, x, µ1, en, y, z, k, v, µ1, û2(t), Â1, p̂1(t), q̂1(t), r̂1(t, ·), ŵ1(t))
∣∣∣E(1)t ] (3.5)
and
H˜2(t, x, en, y, z, k, v)
=ess sup
µ2∈A2
E
[
H2(t, x, µ1, en, y, z, k, v, û1(t), µ2, Â2, p̂2(t), q̂2(t), r̂2(t, ·), ŵ2(t))
∣∣∣E(2)t ] (3.6)
are all concave for all (t, en) ∈ [0, T ]× S a.s.
(3)
E
[
Hˆ1(t, û1(t), û2(t)))
∣∣∣E(1)t ] = ess sup
µ1∈A1
{
E
[
Hˆ1(t, µ1, û2(t))
∣∣∣E(1)t ]} (3.7)
for all t ∈ [0, T ], a.s.
and
E
[
Hˆ2(t, û1(t), û2(t))
∣∣∣E(2)t ] = ess sup
µ2∈A2
{
E
[
Hˆ2(t, û1(t), µ2(t))
∣∣∣E(2)t ]} (3.8)
for all t ∈ [0, T ], a.s. Here
Hˆi(t, u1, u2(t))
=Hi(t, X̂(t), α(t), Ŷi(t), Ẑi(t), K̂i(t, ·), V̂i(t), u1(t), u2(t), Âi(t), p̂i(t), q̂i(t), r̂i(t, ·), ŵi(t))
for i = 1, 2.
(4) ddν∇kĝi(t, ξ) > −1 for i = 1, 2.
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(5) In addition, the integrability condition
E
[ ∫ T
0
{
p̂2i (t)
(
(σ(t)− σ̂(t))2 +
∫
R0
(γ(t, ζ)− γ̂(t, ζ))2 να(dζ) +
D∑
j=1
(ηj(t)− η̂j(t))
2λj(t)
)
+ (X(t) − X̂(t))2
(
q̂2i (t) +
∫
R0
r̂2i (t, ζ)να(dζ) +
D∑
j=1
(wji )
2(t)λj(t)
)
+ (Yi(t)− Ŷi(t))
2
(
(
∂Ĥi
∂z
)2(t) +
∫
R0
∥∥∥∇kĤi(t, ζ)∥∥∥2να(dζ) + D∑
j=1
(
∂Ĥi
∂vj
)2(t)λj(t)
)
+ Â2i (t)
(
(Zi(t)− Ẑi(t))
2 +
∫
R0
(Ki(t, ζ)− K̂i(t, ζ))
2να(dζ) +
D∑
j=1
(V ji (t)− V̂
j
i (t))
2λj(t)
)}
dt
]
<∞
(3.9)
for i = 1, 2. holds.
Then û = (û1(t), û2(t)) is a Nash equilibrium for (2.5), (2.7) and (2.8).
Remark 3.2. In the above Theorem and in the proof in Appendix, we have used the following
shorthand notation: For i = 1, the processes corresponding to u = (u1, uˆ2) are given for
example by X(t) = X(u1,uˆ2)(t) and Y1(t) = Y
(u1,uˆ2)
1 (t) and the processes corresponding to
u = (uˆ1, uˆ2) are Xˆ(t) = X
(uˆ1,uˆ2)(t) and Yˆ1(t) = Y
(uˆ1,uˆ2)
1 (t). Similar notation is used for
i = 2.
Remark 3.3. Let V be an open subset of a Banach space X and let F : V → R.
• We say that F has a directional derivative (or Gateaux derivative) at x ∈ V in the
direction y ∈ X if
DyF (x) := lim
ε→0
1
ε
(F (x+ εy)− F (x)) exists.
• We say that F is Fre´chet differentiable at x ∈ V if there exists a linear map
L : X → R
such that
lim
h→0
h∈X
1
‖h‖
|F (x+ h)− F (x)− L(h)| = 0.
In this case we call L the Fre´chet derivative of F at x, and we write
L = ∇xF.
• If F is Fre´chet differentiable, then F has a directional derivative in all directions
y ∈ X and
DyF (x) = ∇xF (y).
Proof. See Appendix. 
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3.2. An equivalent maximum principle. The concavity condition on the Hamiltonians
does not always hold on many applications. In this section, we shall prove an equivalent
stochastic maximum principle which does not require this assumption. We shall assume the
following:
Assumption A1. For all t0 ∈ [0, T ] and all bounded E
(i)
t0
-measurable random variable θi(ω),
the control process βi defined by
βi(t) := χ]t0,T [(t)θi(ω); t ∈ [0, T ], (3.10)
belongs to Ai, i = 1, 2.
Assumption A2. For all ui ∈ Ai and all bounded βi ∈ Ai, there exists δi > 0 such that
u˜i(t) := ui(t) + ℓβi(t) t ∈ [0, T ], (3.11)
belongs to Ai for all ℓ ∈]− δi, δi[, i = 1, 2.
Assumption A3. For all bounded βi ∈ Ai, the derivatives processes
X1(t) =
d
dℓ
X(u1+ℓβ1,u2)(t)
∣∣∣
ℓ=0
;X2(t) =
d
dℓ
X(u1,u2+ℓβ2)(t)
∣∣∣
ℓ=0
;
y1(t) =
d
dℓ
Y
(u1+ℓβ1,u2)
1 (t)
∣∣∣
ℓ=0
; y2(t) =
d
dℓ
Y
(u1,u2+ℓβ2)
2 (t)
∣∣∣
ℓ=0
;
z1(t) =
d
dℓ
Z
(u1+ℓβ1,u2)
1 (t)
∣∣∣
ℓ=0
; z2(t) =
d
dℓ
Z
(u1,u2+ℓβ2)
2 (t)
∣∣∣
ℓ=0
;
k1(t, ζ) =
d
dℓ
K
(u1+ℓβ1,u2)
1 (t, ζ)
∣∣∣
ℓ=0
; k2(t, ζ) =
d
dℓ
K
(u1,u2+ℓβ2)
2 (t, ζ)
∣∣∣
ℓ=0
;
v
j
1(t) =
d
dℓ
V
j,(u1+ℓβ1,u2)
1 (t)
∣∣∣
ℓ=0
, j = 1, . . . , n; vj2(t) =
d
dℓ
V
j,(u1,u2+ℓβ1)
2 (t)
∣∣∣
ℓ=0
, j = 1, . . . , n
exist and belong to L2([0, T ] × Ω).
It follows from (2.5) and (2.7) that


dX1(t) = X1(t)
{ ∂b
∂x
(t) +
∂σ
∂x
(t) +
∫
R0
∂γ
∂x
(t, ζ)N˜α(dt,dζ) +
∂η
∂x
(t) · dΦ˜(t)
}
+β1(t)
{ ∂b
∂u1
(t) +
∂σ
∂u1
(t) +
∫
R0
∂γ
∂u1
(t, ζ)N˜α(dt,dζ) +
∂η
∂u1
(t) · dΦ˜(t)
}
; t ∈ (0, T ]
X1(0) = 0.
(3.12)
and

dy1(t) = −
{∂g1
∂x
(t)x1(t) +
∂g1
∂y
(t)y1(t) +
∂g1
∂z
(t)z1(t) +
∫
R0
∇kg1(t)k1(t, ζ)να(dζ)
+
∑D
j=1
∂g1
∂v
j
1
(t)vj1(t)λj(t) +
∂g1
∂u
(t)β1(t)
}
dt+ z1(t) dB(t)
+
∫
R0
k1(t, ζ)N˜α(dζ,dt) + v1(t) · dΦ˜(t); t ∈ [0, T ]
y1(T ) =
∂h1
∂x
(X(T ), α(T ))x1(T ).
(3.13)
We can obtain dX2(t) and dy2(t) in a similar way.
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Remark 3.4. As for sufficient conditions for the existence and uniqueness of solutions (3.12)
and (3.13), the reader may consult [17, Eq. (4.1)] (in the case of diffusion state process).
As an example, a set of sufficient conditions under which (3.12) and (3.13) admit a unique
solution is as follows:
(1) Assume that the coefficients b, σ, γ, η, gi, hi, fi, ψi and φi for i = 1, 2 are continuous
with respect to their arguments and are continuously differentiable with respect to
(x, y, z, k, v, u). (Here, the dependence of gi and fi on k is trough
∫
R0
k(ζ)ρ(t, ζ)ν(dζ),
where ρ is a measurable function satisfying 0 ≤ ρ(t, ζ) ≤ c(1 ∧ |ζ|), ∀ζ ∈ R0. Hence
the differentiability in this argument is in the Fre´chet sense.)
(2) The derivatives of b, σ, γ, η and hi, gi, i = 1, 2 are bounded.
(3) The derivatives of fi, i = 1, 2 are bounded by C(1 + |x|+ |u|).
(4) The derivatives of ψi and φi with respect to x are bounded by C(1 + |x|).
We can state the following equivalent maximum principle
Theorem 3.5 (Equivalent Maximum Principle). Let ui ∈ Ai with corresponding solutions
X(t) of (2.5), (Yi(t), Zi(t),Ki(t, ζ), Vi(t)) of (2.7), Ai(t) of (3.2), (pi(t), qi(t), ri(t, ζ), wi(t))
of (3.3) and corresponding derivative processes Xi(t) and (yi(t), zi(t), ki(t, ζ), vi(t)) given by
(3.12) and (3.13), respectively. Suppose that Assumptions A1, A2 and A3 hold. Moreover,
assume the following integrability conditions
E
[ ∫ T
0
p2i (t)
{(∂σ
∂x
)2
(t)X2i (t) +
( ∂σ
∂ui
)2
(t)β2i (t)
+
∫
R0
((∂γ
∂x
)2
(t, ζ)X2i (t) +
( ∂γ
∂ui
)2
(t, ζ)β2i (t)
)
να(dζ)
+
D∑
j=1
((∂ηj
∂x
)2
(t)x2i (t) +
(∂ηj
∂ui
)2
(t)β2i (t)
)
λj(t)
}
dt
+
∫ T
0
X2i (t)
{
q2i (t) +
∫
R0
r2i (t, ζ)να(dζ) +
D∑
j=1
(ηj)2(t)λj(t)
}
dt
]
<∞ (3.14)
and
E
[ ∫ T
0
y2i (t)
{
(
∂Hi
∂z
)2(t) +
∫
R0
‖∇kHi‖
2(t, ζ)να(dζ) +
D∑
j=1
(
∂Hi
∂vj
)2(t)λj(t)
}
dt
+
∫ T
0
A2i (t)
{
z2i (t) +
∫
R0
k2i (t, ζ)να(dζ) +
D∑
j=1
(vji )
2(t)λj(t)
}
dt
]
<∞ for i = 1, 2. (3.15)
Then the following are equivalent:
(1)
d
dℓ
J
(u1+ℓβ1,u2)
1 (t)
∣∣∣
ℓ=0
=
d
dℓ
J
(u1,u2+ℓβ2)
2 (t)
∣∣∣
ℓ=0
= 0 for all bounded β1 ∈ A1, β2 ∈ A2
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(2)
0 = E
[∂H1
∂µ1
(t,X(t), α(t), µ1 , u2, Y1(t), Z1(t),K1(t, ·), V1(t),
A1(t), p1(t), q1(t), r1(t, ·), w1(t))
∣∣∣E(1)t ]
µ1=u1(t)
= E
[∂H2
∂µ2
(t,X(t), α(t), u1 , µ2, Y2(t), Z2(t),K2(t, ·), V2(t),
A2(t), p2(t), q2(t), r2(t, ·), w2(t))
∣∣∣E(2)t ]
µ2=u2(t)
(3.16)
for a.a. t ∈ [0, T ].
Proof. See Appendix. 
Remark 3.6. The result is the same if we start from t ≥ 0 in the performance functional,
hence extending [16, Theorem 2.2] to the Markov regime-switching setting.
Zero-sum Game. In this section, we solve the zero-sum Markov regime-switching forward-
backward stochastic differential games problem (or worst case scenario optimal problem):
That is, we assume that the performance functional for Player II is the negative of that of
Player I, i.e.,
J(t, u1, u2) = J1(t, u1, u2)
:= E
[ ∫ T
t
f(s,X(s), α(s), u1(s), u2(s)) ds + ϕ(X(T ), α(T )) + ψ(Y (t))
∣∣∣Ft]
=: −J2(t, u1, u2). (3.17)
In this case, (u∗1, u
∗
2) is a Nash equilibrium iff
ess sup
u1∈A1
J(t, u1, u
∗
2) = J(t, u
∗
1, u
∗
2) = ess inf
u2∈A2
J(t, u∗1, u2). (3.18)
On one hand, (3.18) implies that
ess inf
u2∈A2
(ess sup
u1∈A1
J(t, u1, u2)) ≤ ess sup
u1∈A1
J(t, u1, u
∗
2)
= J(t, u∗1, u
∗
2) = ess inf
u2∈A2
J(t, u∗1, u2)
≤ ess sup
u1∈A1
(ess inf
u2∈A2
J(t, u1, u2)).
On the other hand, we always have ess inf(ess sup) ≥ ess sup(ess inf). Hence, if (u∗1, u
∗
2) is a
saddle point, then
ess inf
u2∈A2
(ess sup
u1∈A1
J(t, u1, u2)) = ess sup
u1∈A1
(ess inf
u2∈A2
J(t, u1, u2)).
The zero-sum Markov regime-switching forward-backward stochastic differential game prob-
lem is therefore the following:
Problem 3.7. Find u∗1 ∈ A1 and u
∗
2 ∈ A2 (if it exists) such that
ess inf
u2∈A2
(ess sup
u1∈A1
J(t, u1, u2)) = J(t, u
∗
1, u
∗
2) = ess sup
u1∈A1
(ess inf
u2∈A2
J(t, u1, u2)). (3.19)
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When it exists, a control (u∗1, u
∗
2) satisfying (3.19), is called a saddle point. The actions of
the players are opposite, more precisely, between player I and II there is a payoff J(t, u1, u2)
and it is a reward for Player I and cost for Player II.
Remark 3.8. As in the non-zero sum case, we shall give the result for t = 0 and get the
result for t ∈]0, T ] as a corollary. The results obtained in this section generalize the ones in
[16, 1, 10, 12, 8].
In the case of a zero-sum game, we only have one value function for the players and
therefore, Theorem 3.5 becomes
Theorem 3.9 (Equivalent maximum principle for zero-sum game). Let u ∈ A
with corresponding solutions X(t) of (2.5), (Y (t), Z(t),K(t, ζ), V (t)) of (2.7), A(t) of
(3.2), (p(t), q(t), r(t, ζ), wi(t)) of (3.3) and corresponding derivative processes X1(t) and
(y1(t), z1(t), k1(t, ζ), v1(t)) given by (3.12) and (3.13), respectively. Assume that conditions
of Theorem 3.5 are satisfied. Then the following statements are equivalent:
(1)
d
dℓ
J (u1+ℓβ1,u2)(t)
∣∣∣
ℓ=0
=
d
dℓ
J (u1,u2+ℓβ2)(t)
∣∣∣
ℓ=0
= 0 (3.20)
for all bounded β1 ∈ A1, β2 ∈ A2.
(2)
E
[ ∂H
∂µ1
(t, µ1(t), u2(t))
∣∣∣E(1)t ]
µ1=u1(t)
= E
[ ∂H
∂µ2
(t, u1(t), µ2(t))
∣∣∣E(2)t ]
µ2=u2(t)
= 0 (3.21)
for a.a t ∈ [0, T ], where
H(t, u1(t), u2(t))
= H((t,X(t), α(t), u1 , u2, Y (t), Z(t),K(t, ·), V1(t), A(t), p(t), q(t), r(t, ·), w(t)).
Proof. It follows directly from Theorem 3.5. 
Corollary 3.10. If u = (u1, u2) ∈ A1 × A2 is a Nash equilibrium for the zero-sum game in
Theorem 3.9, then equalities (3.21) holds.
Proof. If u = (u1, u2) ∈ A1×A2 is a Nash equilibrium, then it follows from Theorem 3.9 that
(3.20) holds by (3.18). 
4. Applications
4.1. Application to robust utility maximization with entropy penalty. In this sec-
tion, we apply the results obtained to study an utility maximization problem under model
uncertainty. We shall assume here that E
(1)
t = E
(2)
t = Ft. The framework is that of [1]. We
aim at finding a probability measure Q ∈ QF that minimizes the functional
EQ
[ ∫ t
0
a0S
κ(s)U1(s)ds+ a0S
κ(T )U2(T )
]
+ EQ
[
Rκ(0, T )
]
, (4.1)
where
QF :=
{
Q|Q≪ P, Q = P on F0 and H(Q|P ) := EQ
[
ln
dQ
dP
]}
,
with
a0 and a0 being non-negative constants;
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κ = (κ(t))0≤t≤T a non-negative bounded and progressively measurable;
U1 = (U1(t))0≤t≤T a progressively measurable with EP
[
exp[γ1
∫ T
0 |U1(t)|dt]
]
<∞, ∀γ1 > 0;
U2(T ) a FT−measurable random variable with EP
[
exp[|γ1U2(T )|]
]
<∞, ∀γ1 > 0;
Sκ = exp(−
∫ t
0 κ(s)ds) is the discount factor and R
κ(t, T ) is the penalization term, represent-
ing the sum of the entropy rate and the terminal entropy, i.e
Rκ(t, T ) =
1
Sκ(t)
∫ T
t
κ(s)Sκ(s) ln
G
Q
0 (s)
G
Q
0 (t)
ds+
Sκ(T )
Sκ(t)
ln
GQ(T )
G
Q
0 (t)
(4.2)
with GQ = (GQ(t))0≤t≤T is the RCLL P -martingale representing the density of Q with respect
to P , i.e
GQ(t) =
dQ
dP
∣∣∣
Ft
GT represents the Radon-Nikodym derivative on FT of Q with respect to P . More precisely
Problem 4.1. Find Q∗ ∈ QF such that
Y Q
∗
(t) = ess infQ∈QF Y
Q(t) (4.3)
with
Y Q(t) :=
1
Sκ(t)
EQ
[ ∫ T
t
a0S
κ(s)U1(s)ds+ a0S
κ(T )U2(T )
∣∣∣Ft]+ EQ[Rκ(t, T )∣∣∣Ft]. (4.4)
In the present regime switching jump-diffusion setup, we consider the model uncertainty
given by a probability measure Q having a density (Gθ(t))0≤t≤T with respect to P satisfies
the following SDE

 dG
θ(t) = Gθ(t)
[
θ0(t)dB(t) + θ1(t) · dΦ˜(t) +
∫
R0
θ2(t, ζ) N˜α(dζ,dt)
]
, t ∈ [0, T ]
Gθ(0) = 1,
(4.5)
Using Itoˆ’s formula, one can easily check that
Gθ(t) = exp
[ ∫ t
0
θ0(s)dB(s)−
1
2
∫ t
0
θ20(s)ds+
∫ t
0
∫
R0
ln(1 + θ2(ζ, s))N˜α(dζ,ds)
+
∫ t
0
∫
R0
{ln(1 + θ2(s, ζ))− θ2(s, ζ)}να(dζ)ds+
D∑
j=1
∫ t
0
ln(1 + θ1,j(s)) · dΦ˜j(s)
+
D∑
j=1
∫ t
0
{ln(1 + θ1,j(s))− θ1,j(s)}λj(s)ds
]
. (4.6)
Now, put Gθ(t, s) = G
θ(s)
Gθ(t)
, s ≥ t then (Gθ(t, s))0≤t≤s≤T satisfies
 dG
θ(t, s) = Gθ(t, s−)
[
θ0(s)dB(s) + θ1(s) · dΦ˜(s) +
∫
R0
θ2(s, ζ) N˜α(ds,dζ)
]
, s ∈ [t, T ]
Gθ(t, t) = 1.
(4.7)
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Note that θ = (θ0, θ1, θ2) may be seen as a scenario control. Denote by A the set of all
admissible controls θ = (θ0, θ1, θ2) such that
E
[ ∫ T
0
(
θ20(t) +
D∑
j=1
θ21,j(t)λj(t) +
∫
R0
θ22(t, ζ)να(dζ)
)
dt
]
<∞
and θ2(t, ζ) ≥ −1 + ǫ for some ǫ > 0. (4.4) can be rewritten as
Y Q(t) =EQ
[ ∫ T
t
a0e
−
∫ s
t
κ(r)drU1(s)ds+ a0e
−
∫ T
t
κ(r)drU2(T )
∣∣∣Ft]
+ EQ
[ ∫ T
t
κ(s)e−
∫ s
t
κ(r)dr lnGθ(t, s)ds+ e−
∫ T
t
κ(r)dr lnGθ(t, T )
∣∣∣Ft]
=E
[ ∫ T
t
a0G
θ(t, s)e−
∫ s
t
κ(r)drU1(s)ds+ a0G
θ(t, T )e−
∫ T
t
κ(r)drU2(T )
∣∣∣Ft]
+ E
[ ∫ T
t
κ(s)e−
∫ s
t
κ(r)drGθ(t, s) lnGθ(t, s)ds
+ e−
∫ T
t
κ(r)drGθ(t, T ) lnGθ(t, T )
∣∣∣Ft]. (4.8)
Now, define h1 by
h1(θ(t)) :=
1
2
θ20(t) +
D∑
j=1
{(1 + θ1,j(t) ln(1 + θ1,j(t))− θ1,j}λj(t)
+
∫
R0
{(1 + θ2(t, ζ)) ln(1 + θ2(t, ζ))− θ2(t, ζ)}να(dζ). (4.9)
Using the Itoˆ-Le´vy product rule, we have
E
[ ∫ T
t
κ(s)e−
∫ s
t
κ(r)drGθ(t, s) lnGθ(t, s)ds+ e−
∫ T
t
κ(r)drGθ(t, T ) lnGθ(t, T )
∣∣∣Ft]
=E
[ ∫ T
t
e−
∫ s
t
κ(r)drGθ(t, s)h(θ(s))ds
∣∣∣Ft]. (4.10)
Substituting (4.10) into (4.8), leads to
Y Q(t) =Et
[ ∫ T
t
a0G
θ(t, s)e−
∫ s
t
κ(r)drU1(s)ds+ a0G
θ(t, T )e−
∫ T
t
κ(r)drU2(T )
]
+ Et
[ ∫ T
t
κ(s)e−
∫ s
t
κ(r)drGθ(t, s) lnGθ(t, s)ds+ e−
∫ T
t
κ(r)drGθ(t, T ) lnGθ(t, T )
]
=Et
[ ∫ T
t
e−
∫ s
t
κ(r)drGθ(t, s)
(
a0U1(s) + h(θ(s))
)
ds+ a0G
θ(t, T )e−
∫ T
t
κ(r)drU2(T )
]
.
(4.11)
We have the following theorem
Theorem 4.2. Suppose that the penalty function is given by (4.9). Then the optimal Y Q
∗
is
such that (Y Q
∗
, Z,W,K) is the unique solution to the following quadratic BSDE
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

dY (t) = −
[
− κ(t)Y (t) + aU1(t)− Z
2(t) +
∑D
j=1 λj(t)(−e
Wj −Wj + 1)
+
∫
R0
(−e−K(t,ζ) −K(t, ζ) + 1)ναdζ
]
dt+ Z(t)dB(t)
+
∑D
j=1Wj(t)dΦ˜j(t) +
∫
R0
K(t, ζ)N˜α(dt,dζ)
Y (T ) = a0U2(T ),
(4.12)
Moreover, the optimal measure Q∗ solution of Problem 4.1 admits the Radon-Nikodym density
(GQ(t, s))0≤t≤s≤T given by

dGθ(t, s) = Gθ(t, s−)
[
− Z(s)dB(s) +
∑D
j=1(e
−Wj − 1) · dΦ˜)j(s)
+
∫
R0
(e−K(s,ζ) − 1) N˜ (ds,dζ)
]
, s ∈ [t, T ]
G(t, t) = 1.
(4.13)
Proof. Fix u1 and denote by X(T ) the corresponding wealth process. One can see that
Problem 4.1 can be obtained from our general control problem by settingX(t) = 0, ∀t ∈ [0, T ],
h(X(T ), α(T )) = a0U2(T ), f = 0, φ(x) = 0 and ψ(x) = I. Since h1(θ) given by (4.9) is convex
in θ0, θ1 and θ2, it follows that conditions of Theorem 3.1 are satisfied. The Hamiltonian in
this case is reduced to:
H(t, y, z,K,W ) = λ(U1(t) + h(θ) + θ0z) +
D∑
j=1
λjθ1,jWj +
∫
R0
θ2(·, ζ)K(·, ζ)να(dζ) (4.14)
Minimizing H with respect to θ = (θ0, θ1, θ2) gives the first order condition of optimality for
an optimal θ∗,

∂H
∂θ0
= 0 i.e., θ∗0(t) = −Z(t),
∂H
∂θ1,j
= 0 i.e., − ln(1 + θ∗1,j)(t) = −W1,j(t) for j = 1, . . . ,D,
∇θ2H = 0 i.e., − ln(1 + θ
∗
2)(t, ζ) = −K(·, ζ), να- a.e.
(4.15)
On the hand, one can show using product rule (see e.g., [15]) that Y given by (??) is solution
to the following linear BSDE

dY (t) = −
[
− κ(t)Y (t) + aU1(t) + h(θ) + θ0Z(t) +
∑D
j=1 θ1,j(t)λj(t)Wj
+
∫
R0
θ2(t, ζ)K(t, ζ)ναdζ
]
dt+ Z(t)dB(t) +W (t) · dΦ˜(t)
+
∫
R0
K(t, ζ)N˜α(dt,dζ)
Y (T ) = a0U2(T ),
(4.16)
Using comparison theorem for BSDE, Q∗ is an optimal measure for Problem 4.1 if θ∗ is such
that
g(θ∗) = min
θ
g(θ) (4.17)
for each t and ω, with g(θ) := h(θ) + θ0Z(t) +
∑D
j=1 θ1,j(t)λj(t)Wj +
∫
R0
θ2(t, ζ)K(t, ζ)ναdζ.
This is equivalent to the first condition of optimality. Hence (θ∗0, θ
∗
1,1, . . . , θ
∗
1,D, θ
∗
2) satisfying
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(4.15) will satisfy (4.17). Substituting θ∗0, θ
∗
1,1, . . . , θ
∗
1,D, θ
∗
2 into (4.16) leads to (4.12). Fur-
thermore, substituting θ∗0, θ
∗
1,1, . . . , θ
∗
1,D, θ
∗
2 into (4.7) gives (4.13). The proof of the theorem
is complete. 
Remark 4.3.
• This result can be seen as an extension to the Markov regime-switching setting of [12,
Theorem 1] or [1, Theorem 2].
• Let us mention that in the case (X(t))0≤t≤T is not zero and has a particular dynamics
(mean-reverting or exponential Markov Le´vy switching) one can use Theorem 3.1 to
solve a problem of recursive robust utility mazimization as in [16, Section 4.2] or [15,
Theorem 4.1]
4.2. Application to optimal investment of an insurance company under model
uncertainty. In this section, we use our general framework to study a problem of optimal
investment of an insurance company under model uncertainty. The uncertainty here is also
described by a family of probability measures. Such problem was solved in [8] using dynamic
programming approach. We shall show that our general maximum principle enables us to
solve the problem. We shall restrict ourselves to the case E
(1)
t = E
(2)
t = Ft, t ∈ [0, T ].
The model is that of [8, Section 2.1]. Let (Ω,F , P ) be a complete probability space with
P representing a reference probability measure from which a family of real-world probability
measures are generated. We shall suppose that (Ω,F , P ) is big enough to take into ac-
count uncertainties coming from future insurance claims, fluctuation of financial prices and
structural changes in economics conditions. We consider a continuous-time Markov regime
switching economic model with a bond and a stock or share index.
The evolution of the state of an economy over time is modeled by a continuous-time, finite-
state, observable Markov chain α := {α(t), t ∈ [0, T ]; T < ∞} on (Ω,F , P ), taking values in
the state space S = {e1, e2, . . . , eD}, where D ≥ 2. We denote by Λ := {λnj : 1 ≤ n, j ≤ D}
the intensity matrix of the Markov chain under P . Hence, for each 1 ≤ n, j ≤ D, λnj is the
transition intensity of the chain from state en to state ej at time t. It is assumed that for
n 6= j, λnj > 0 and
∑D
j=1 λnj = 0, hence λnn < 0. The dynamics of (α(t))0≤t≤T is given in
Section 2.
Let r = {r(t)}t∈[0,T ] be the instantaneous interest rate of the money market account B at
time t. Then
r(t) := 〈r, α(t)〉 =
D∑
j=1
rj〈α(t), ej〉 , (4.18)
where 〈·, ·〉 is the usual scalar product in RD and r = (r1, . . . , rD) ∈ R
D
+ . Here the value rj ,
the jth entry of the vector r, represents the value of the interest rate when the Markov chain
is in the state ej , i.e., when α(t) = ej. The price dynamics of B can now be written as
dS0(t) = S0r(t)dt, S0(0) = 1, t ∈ [0, T ]. (4.19)
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Moreover, let µ = {µ(t)}t∈[0,T ] and σ = {σ(t)}t∈[0,T ] denote respectively the mean return
and the volatility of the stock at time t. Using the same convention, we have
µ(t) =〈µ, α(t)〉 =
D∑
j=1
µj〈α(t), ej〉 ,
σ(t) =〈σ, α(t)〉 =
D∑
j=1
σj〈α(t), ej〉 ,
where
µ = (µ1, µ2, . . . , µD) ∈ R
D,
and
σ = (σ1, σ2, . . . , σD) ∈ R+
D.
In a similar way, µj and σi represent respectively the appreciation rate and volatility of the
stock when the Markov chain is in state ej, i.e., when α(t) = ej. Let B = {Bt}t∈[0,T ] denotes
the standard Brownian motion on (Ω,F , P ) with respect to its right-continuous complete
filtration FB := {FBt }0≤t≤T . Then, the dynamic of the stock price S = {S(t)}t∈[0,T ] is given
by the following Markov regime-switching geometric Brownian motion
dS(t) = S(t) [µ(t)dt+ σ(t)dB(t)] , S(0) = S0 (4.20)
Let Z0 := {Z0(t)}t∈[0,T ] be a real-valued Markov regime-switching pure jump process on
(Ω,F , P ). Here Z0(t) can be considered as the aggregate amount of claims up to and including
time t. Since Z0 is a pure jump process, one has
Z0(t) =
∑
0<u≤t
∆Z0(u), Z0(0) = 0, P -a.s, t ∈ [0, T ] (4.21)
where for each u ∈ [0, T ], ∆Z0(u) = Z0(u) − Z0(u
−), represents the jump size of Z0 at time
u.
Assume that the state space of claim size denoted by Z is (0,∞). Let M be the product
space [0, T ]×Z of claim arrival time and claim size. Define a random measure N0(·, ·) on the
product space M, which selects claim arrivals and size ζ := Z0(u) − Z0(u
−) at time u, then
the aggregate insurance claim process Z0 can be written as
Z0(t) =
∫ t
0
∫ ∞
0
ζN0(du,dζ), t ∈ [0, T ]. (4.22)
Define, for each t ∈ [0, T ]
NΛ0(t) =
∫ t
0
∫ ∞
0
N0(du,dζ), t ∈ [0, T ]. (4.23)
Then NΛ0(t) counts the number of claim arrivals up to time t. Assume that, under the
measure P , NΛ0 := {NΛ0(t)}t∈[0,T ] is a conditional Poisson process on (Ω,F , P ) with intensity
Λ0 := {λ0(t)}t∈[0,T ] modulated by the chain α given by
λ0(t) := 〈λ0, α(t)〉 =
D∑
j=1
λ0j〈α(t), ej〉 , (4.24)
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with λ0 = (λ01, . . . , λ
0
D) ∈ R
D
+ . Here the value λ
o
j , the j
th entry of the vector λ0, represents
the intensity rate of N when the Markov chain is in the space state ej , i.e., when α(t
−) = ej .
Denote by Fj(ζ), j = 1, . . . ,D the probability distribution of the claim size
ζ := Z0(u)−Z0(u
−) when α(t−) = ej . Then, the compensator of the Markov regime switching
random measure N0(·, ·) under P is given by
ν0α(du,dζ) :=
D∑
j=1
〈α(u−), ej〉λ
0
jFj(dζ)du. (4.25)
Hence a compensated version N˜0α(·, ·) of the Markov regime-switching random measure is
defined by
N˜0α(du,dζ) = N
0(du,dζ)− ν0α(du,dζ). (4.26)
The premium rate P0(t) at time t is given by
P0(t) := 〈P0, α(t)〉 =
D∑
j=1
P0,j〈α(t), ej〉, (4.27)
with P0 = (P0,1, . . . , P0,D) ∈ R
D
+ . Let R0 := {R0(t)}t∈[0,T ] be the surplus process of the
insurance company without investment. Then
R0(t) :=r0 +
∫ t
0
P0(u)du− Z0(t)
=r0 +
D∑
j=1
P0,jJj(t)−
∫ t
0
∫ ∞
0
ζN0(du,dζ), t ∈ [0, T ], (4.28)
with R0(0) = r0. For each j = 1, . . . ,D and each t ∈ [0, T ], Jj(t) is the occupation time of
the chain α in the state ej up to time t, that is
Jj(t) =
∫ t
0
〈α(u), ej〉du. (4.29)
The following information structure will be important for the derivation of the dynamic of the
company’ surplus process. Let FZ0 := {FZ0}0≤t≤T denote the right-continuous P -completed
filtration generated by Z0. For each t ∈ [0, T ] define Ft := F
Z0
t ∨F
B
t ∨F
α
t as the minimal σ-
algebra generated by FZ0t , F
B
t and F
α
t and write F = {Ft}0≤t≤T as the information accessible
to the company.
From now on, we assume that the insurance company invests the amount of π(t) in the
stock at time t, for each t ∈ [0, T ]. Then π = {π(t), t ∈ [0, T ]} represents the portfolio process.
Denote by X = {Xπ(t)}t∈[0,T ] the wealth process of the company. One can show that the
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dynamic of the surplus process is given by

dX(t) =
{
P0(t) + r(t)X(t) + π(t)(µ(t) − r(t))
}
dt+ σ(t)π(t)dB(t)
−
∫ ∞
0
ζN0(dt,dζ)
=
{
P0(t) + r(t)X(t) + π(t)(µ(t) − r(t))−
∫ ∞
0
ζν0α( dζ)
}
dt
+σ(t)π(t)dB(t)−
∫ ∞
0
ζN˜0α(dt,dζ), t ∈ [0, T, ]
X(0) = X0.
(4.30)
Definition 4.4. A portfolio π is admissible if it satisfies
(1) π is F-progressively measurable;
(2) (4.30) admits a unique strong solution;
(3)
∑D
j=1E
[ ∫ T
0
{
|P0,j + rjX(t) + π(t)(µj − rj)|+ σ
2
jπ
2(t) + λ0j
∫∞
0 ζ
2Fj( dζ)
}
dt
]
<∞;
(4) X(t) ≥ 0, ∀t ∈ [0, T ], P -a.s.
We denote by A the space of all admissible portfolios.
Define G := {Gt, t ∈ [0, T ]}, where Gt := F
B
t ∨F
Z0
t , and for n, j = 1, . . . ,D, let {Cnj(t), t ∈
[0, T ]} be a real-valued, G-predictable, bounded, stochastic process on (Ω,F , P ) such that for
each t ∈ [0, T ] Cnj ≥ 0 for n 6= j and
∑D
n=1Cnj(t) = 0, i.e, Cnn ≤ 0.
We consider a model uncertainty setup given by a probability measure Q = Qθ,C which is
equivalent to P , with Radon-Nikodym derivative on Ft given by
dQ
dP
∣∣∣
Ft
= Gθ,C(t), (4.31)
where, for 0 ≤ t ≤ T , Gθ,C is a F-martingale. Under Qθ,C, C := {C(t), t ∈ [0, T ]} with
C(t) := [Cnj(t)]n,j=1,...,D is a family of rate matrices of the Markov chain α(t); See e.g., [? ].
For each t ∈ [0, T ], we set
DC0 (t) := D
C(t)− diag(dC(t)),
with dC(t) = (dC11, . . . , d
C
DD)
′ ∈ RD and
DC :=
[Cnj(t)
λnj(t)
]
n,j=1,··· ,D
= [dCnj(t)]. (4.32)
We denote by C the space of all families intensity matrices C with bounded components.
The Radon-Nikodym derivative or density process Gθ,C is given by

dGθ,C(t) = Gθ,C(t−)
{
θ(t)dB(t) +
∫ ∞
0
θ(t)N˜0α(dt,dζ)
+(DC0 (u)α(u) − 1)
′ · dΦ˜(t)
}
, t ∈ [0, T ],
Gθ,C(0) = 1,
(4.33)
where ′ represents the transpose. Here (θ,C) may be regarded as scenario control. A control
θ is admissible if θ is F-progressively measurable, with θ(t) = θ(t, ω) ≤ 1 for a.a (t, ω) ∈
[0, T ]× Ω, and
∫ T
0 θ
2(t)dt <∞. We denote by Θ the space of such admissible processes.
Next, we formulate the optimal investment problem under model uncertainty. Let U :
(0,∞) −→ R, be an utility function which is strictly increasing, strictly concave and twice
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continuously differentiable. The objectives of the insurance firm and the market are the
following:
Problem 4.5. Find a portfolio process π∗ ∈ A and the process (θ∗,C∗) ∈ Θ× C such that
sup
π∈A
inf
(θ,C)∈Θ×C
EQθ,C
[
Uπ(XT )
]
=EQθ∗,C∗
[
Uπ
∗
(XT )
]
= inf
(θ,C)∈Θ×C
sup
π∈A
EQθ,C
[
Uπ(XT )
]
. (4.34)
This problem can be seen as a zero-sum stochastic differential game problem of an insurance
form. On one hand, we have
EQθ,C
[
Uπ(XT )
]
= E
[
Gθ,C(T )U(Xπ(T ))
]
. (4.35)
Now, define Y (t) = Y θ,C,π(t) by
Y (t) = E
[Gθ,C(T )
Gθ,C(t)
U(Xπ(T ))
∣∣∣Ft]. (4.36)
Then, it can easily be shown that Y (t) is the solution to the following linear BSDE

dY (t) = −
[
θ(t)Z0(t) +
∫
R0
θ(t)K(t, ζ)ν0α( dζ) +
D∑
j=1
(DC0 (t)α(t) − 1)jλjVj(t)
]
dt
Z0(t)dB(t) +
∫
R0
K(t, ζ)N˜0α(dζ,dt) + V (t) · dΦ˜(t), t ∈ [0, T ],
Y (T ) = U(Xπ(T )).
(4.37)
Noting that
Y (0) = Y θ,C,π(0) = EQθ,C
[
Uπ(XT )
]
, (4.38)
Problem 4.5 becomes
Problem 4.6. Find a portfolio process π∗ ∈ A and the process (θ∗,C∗) ∈ Θ× C such that
sup
π∈A
inf
(θ,C)∈Θ×C
Y θ,C,π(0) = Y θ
∗,C∗,π∗(0) = inf
(θ,C)∈Θ×C
sup
π∈A
Y θ,C,π(0), (4.39)
where Y θ,C,π is described by the forward-Backward system (4.30) and (4.37).
Theorem 4.7. Let Xπ(t) be dynamic of the surplus process satisfying (4.30). Consider the
optimization problem to find π∗ ∈ A and (θ∗,C∗) ∈ Θ × C such that (4.34) (or equivalently
(4.39)) holds, with
Y θ,C,π(t) = E
[Gθ,C(T )
Gθ,C(t)
U(Xπ(T ))
∣∣∣Ft]. (4.40)
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Moreover, suppose that U(x) = −e−βx, β ≥ 0. Then the optimal investment π∗(t) and the
optimal scenario measure of the market (θ∗,C∗) are given respectively by
θ∗(t) =−
D∑
n=1
(µn(t)− rn(t)− σ2n(t)π∗(t, en)β
σn
)
〈α(t), en〉, (4.41)
π∗(t) =
D∑
n=1
(∫
R+
(eβζ − 1)λ0nFn(dζ)
βσn
)
〈α(t), en〉, (4.42)
and the optimal C∗ satisfies the following constraint linear optimization problem:
min
C1j ,...,CDj
D∑
j=1
(DC0 (t)en − 1)jλnjVj(t) j = 1, . . . ,D, (4.43)
subject to the linear constraints
D∑
n=1
Cnj(t) = 0,
where Vj is given by (4.63).
Moreover, if we assume that the space of family matrix rates (Cnj)n,j=1,2 is bounded and
write Cnj(t) ∈
[
C l(n, j), Cu(n, j)
]
with C l(n, j) < Cu(n, j), n, j = 1, 2. Then, in this case,
the optimal C∗ is given by:
C∗21(t) = C
l(2, 1)IV1(t)−V2(t)>0 + C
u(2, 1)IV1(t)−V2(t)<0,
C∗11(t) = −C
∗
21(t). (4.44)
The same we have that the solution for problem 4.68 is given by:
C∗21(t) = C
l(2, 1)IV2(t)−V1(t)−>0 + C
u(2, 1)IV2(t)−V1(t)<0,
C∗22(t) = −C
∗
12(t). (4.45)
Proof. One can see that this is a particular case of a zero-sum stochastic differential game
of the forward-backward system of the form (2.5) and (2.7) with ψ = Id, ϕ = f = 0 and
h(x) = U(x). The Hamiltonian in Section 3 is reduced to
H(t, x, eny, z, k, v, π, θ, a, p, q, r
0 , w)
=a
[
θz +
∫
R+
θk(t, ζ)ν0en( dζ) +
D∑
j=1
(DC0 (t)en − 1)jλnjvj(t)
]
+
[
P0(t) + rx+ π(µ − r)−
∫
R+
ζν0en(dζ)
]
p
+ σπq −
∫
R+
ζr0(t, ζ)ν0en(dζ). (4.46)
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The adjoint processes A(t) ,(p(t), q(t), r0(t, ζ), w(t)) associated with the Hamiltonian are given
by the following forward-backward SDE

 dA(t) = A(t)
[
θ(t)dB(t) +
∫
R+
θ(t)N˜0α(dζ,dt) + (D
C
0 (t)α(t) − 1)
′ · dΦ˜(t)
]
, t ∈ [0, T ],
A(0) = 1,
(4.47)
and

 dp(t) = −r(t)p(t)dt+ q(t)dB(t) +
∫
R+
r0(t, ζ)N˜0α(dζ,dt) +W (t) · dΦ˜(t), t ∈ [0, T ],
p(T ) = A(T )U ′(X(T )).
(4.48)
It is clear that the functions h, φ and H satisfy the assumptions of Theorem 3.9.
Maximizing the Hamiltonian H with respect to π gives the first order condition for an
optimal π∗.
∂H
∂π
= 0 i.e, (µ− r)p+ σq = 0. (4.49)
The BSDE (4.48) is linear in p, hence we shall try a process p(t) of the form
p(t) = βf(t, α(t))A(t)e−βX(t) , (4.50)
where f(·, en) satisfies a differential equation to be determined. Applying the Itoˆ-Le´vy’s
formula for jump-diffusion, Markov regime-switching process (see e.g., [21, Theorem 4.1]), we
get
d
(
A(t)e−βX(t)
)
=e−βX(t)A(t)
[
θ(t)dB(t) +
∫
R+
θ(t)N˜0α(dζ,dt) + (D
C
0 (t)α(t)− 1)
′ · dΦ˜(t)
]
+A(t)e−βX(t)
[(
− β
{
P0(t) + r(t)X(t) + π(t)(µ(t) − r(t))
}
+
1
2
β2σ2(t)π2(t)
+
∫
R+
(eβζ − 1)ν0α(dζ)
)
dt− βσ(t)π(t)dB(t) +
∫
R+
(eβζ − 1)N˜0α(dζ,dt)
]
− βA(t)e−βX(t)θ(t)σ(t)π(t)dt+
∫
R+
θ(t)A(t)e−βX(t)(eβζ − 1)N0α(dζ,dt)
=A(t)e−βX(t)
[(
− β
{
P0(t) + r(t)X(t) + π(t)(µ(t) − r(t))
}
− βθ(t)σ(t)π(t)
+
1
2
β2σ2(t)π2(t) +
∫
R+
(1 + θ(t))(eβζ − 1)ν0α(dζ)
)
dt
+ (θ(t)− βσ(t)π(t))dB(t) +
∫
R+
{
(1 + θ(t))(eβζ − 1) + θ(t)
}
N˜0α(dζ,dt)
+ (DC0 (t)α(t) − 1)
′ · dΦ˜(t)
]
. (4.51)
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Putting A(t)e−βX(t) = P1(t), then p(t) = βf(t, α(t))P1(t) and using once more the Itoˆ-Le´vy’s
formula for jump-diffusion Markov regime-switching process, we get
dp(t) =βd
(
f(t, α(t))P1(t)
)
=β
[
f ′(t, α(t))P1(t)dt+ f(t, α(t))P1(t)
[(
− β
{
P0(t) + r(t)X(t) + π(t)(µ(t) − r(t))
}
− βθ(t)σ(t)π(t) +
1
2
β2σ2(t)π2(t) +
∫
R+
(1 + θ(t))(eβζ − 1)ν0α(dζ)
)
dt
+ (θ(t)− βσ(t)π(t))dB(t)
]
+
D∑
j=1
(
f(t, ej)− f(t, α(t))
)
P1(t)(D
C
0,α(t))
jλj(t)dt
+
∫
R+
f(t, α(t))P1(t)
{
(1 + θ(t))(eβζ − 1) + θ(t)
}
N˜0α(dζ,dt)
+
D∑
j=1
P1(t)
(
f(t, ej)(D
C
0,α(t))
j − f(t, α(t))
)
dΦ˜j(t)
]
, (4.52)
where (DC0,α(t))
j = (DC0 (t)α(t))
j . Comparing (4.52) with (4.48), by equating the terms in dt,
dB(t), N˜α(dζ,dt), and dΦ˜j(t) j = 1, . . . ,D, respectively, we get
q(t) = (θ∗ − βσ(t)π∗(t))p(t). (4.53)
Substituting this into (4.49) gives,
(µ− r)p =− σ
(
θ∗ − σ(t)π∗(t)β
)
p,
i.e., θ∗(t) =−
D∑
j=1
(µj(t)− rj(t)− σ2j (t)π∗(t, ej)β
σj
)
〈α(t), sj〉. (4.54)
On the other hand, we also have
r0(t, ζ) = p(t)
{
(1 + θ(t))(eβζ − 1) + θ(t)
}
(4.55)
and
wj(t) = β
{
P1(t)
(
f(t, ej)(D
C
0,α(t))
j − f(t, α(t))
)}
, (4.56)
with the function f(·, en) satisfying the following backward differential equation:
f ′(t, en) + f(t, en)
[
− β
{
P0(t, en) + r(t, en)X(t) + π(t)(µ(t, en)− r(t, en))
}
+ r(t, en)
− βθ(t)σ(t, en)π(t) +
1
2
β2σ2(t, en)π
2(t) +
∫
R+
(1 + θ(t))(eβζ − 1)λ0nFen(dζ)
]
+
D∑
j=1
(
f(t, ej)− f(t, en)
)
(DC0,en(t))njλnj = 0, (4.57)
with the terminal condition f(T, en) = 1, for n = 1, . . . ,D. The solution of such backward
equation can be found in [8]. Minimizing the Hamiltonian H with respect to θ gives the first
order condition for an optimal θ∗.
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∂H
∂θ
= 0 i.e., z +
∫
R+
k(t, ζ)ν0α(dζ) = 0. (4.58)
The BSDE (4.37) is linear in Y , hence we shall try the process Y (t) of the form
Y (t) = f1(t, α(t))Y1(t) with Y1(t) = e
−βX(t), (4.59)
where f1(·, en), n = 1, . . . ,D is a deterministic function satisfying a backward differential
equation to be determined. Applying the Itoˆ-Le´vy’s formula for jump-diffusion Markov
regime-switching, we get
dY (t) =f ′1(t, α(t))e
−βX(t)dt− f1(t, α(t))Y1(t)β
{
p0(t) + r(t)X(t)
+ π(t)(µ(t) − r(t))−
1
2
βσ2(t)π2(t) +
1
β
∫
R+
(eβζ − 1)ν0α(dζ)
}
dt
+
D∑
j=1
(
f1(t, ej)− f1(t, α(t))
)
Y1(t)λj(t)dt
− f1(t, α(t))Y1(t)βσ(t)π(t)dB(t) +
∫
R+
f1(t, α(t))Y1(t)(e
βζ − 1)N˜0α(dζ,dt)
+
D∑
j=1
(
f1(t, ej)− f1(t, α(t))
)
Y1(t)dΦ˜j(t). (4.60)
Comparing (4.60) and (4.37), we get
Z(t) =− βY (t)σ(t)π(t), (4.61)
K(t, ζ) =Y (t)(eβζ − 1), (4.62)
Vj(t) =
{
f1(t, ej)− f1(t, α(t)
}
Y1(t). (4.63)
Substituting Z(t) and K(t, ζ) into (4.58), we get
βσ(t)π∗(t) =
∫
R+
(eβζ − 1)ν0α(dζ),
i.e., π∗(t) =
D∑
n=1
(∫
R+
(eβζ − 1)λ0nFn(dζ)
βσn
)
〈α(t), en〉. (4.64)
Substituting (4.61)-(4.63) into (4.60), we deduce that the function f1(·, en) satisfies the fol-
lowing backward differential equation
f ′1(t, en) + f1(t, en)
[
− β
{
P0(t, en) + r(t, en)X(t) + π(t)(µ(t, en)− r(t, en))
}
+ r(t, en)
− βθ(t)σ(t, en)π(t) +
1
2
β2σ2(t, en)π
2(t) +
∫
R+
(1 + θ(t))(eβζ − 1)λ0nFen(dζ)
]
+
D∑
j=1
(
f1(t, ej)− f1(t, en)
)
(DC0,en(t))njλnj = 0 (4.65)
with the terminal condition f1(T, en) = −1 for n = 1, . . . ,D.
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As for the optimal (Cnj)n,j=1,...,D, the only part of the Hamiltonian that depends on C is
the sum
∑D
j=1(D
C
0 (t)en − 1)jλnjVj(t), Hence minimizing the Hamiltonian with respect to C
is equivalent to minimizing the following system of differential operator
min
C1j ,...,CDj
D∑
j=1
(DC0 (t)en − 1)jλnjVj(t) j = 1, . . . ,D, (4.66)
subject to the linear constraints
D∑
n=1
Cnj(t) = 0.
Hence, one can obtain the solution in the two-states case(since C is bounded ) with Vj and
f1 given by (4.63) and (4.65) respectively. More specifically, when the Markov has only two
states, we have to solve the following two linear programming problems:
min
C11(t),C21(t)
(V1(t)− V2(t))C21(t) + λ21(V2(t)− V1(t)) (4.67)
subject to the linear constraint
C11 + C21 = 0.
and
min
C12(t),C22(t)
(V2(t)− V1(t))C12(t) + λ12(V1(t)− V2(t)) (4.68)
subject to the linear constraint
C12 + C22 = 0.
By imposing that the space of family matrix rates (Cnj)n,j=1,2 is bounded we can write
that Cnj(t) ∈
[
C l(n, j), Cu(n, j)
]
with C l(n, j) < Cu(n, j), i, j = 1, 2. The solution to the
preceding two linear control problems are then given by:
C∗21(t) = C
l(2, 1)IV1(t)−V2(t)>0 + C
u(2, 1)IV1(t)−V2(t)<0,
C∗11(t) = −C
∗
21(t). (4.69)
The same we have that the solution for problem 4.68 is given by:
C∗21(t) = C
l(2, 1)IV2(t)−V1(t)−>0 + C
u(2, 1)IV2(t)−V1(t)<0,
C∗22(t) = −C
∗
12(t). (4.70)
The proof is completed

Remark 4.8.
• Assume for example that the distribution of the claim size is of exponential type
(with parameter λ˜0j > 2β, j = 1, . . . , n). Moreover, assume that π, θ and C are
given by (4.64), (4.54) and (4.66), respectively. Then each of the following equa-
tions: Eq. (4.30), (4.37), (4.47) and (4.48) admits a unique solution. The solu-
tion (Ŷ (t), Ẑ(t), K̂(t, ζ), V̂ (t)) (respectively (p̂i(t), q̂i(t), r̂i(t, ζ), ŵi(t))) to (4.37) (re-
spectively (4.48)) is given by (4.59), (4.61), (4.62) and (4.63) (respectively (4.50),
(4.53), (4.55) and (4.56)).
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• We note that f given by (4.57) and f1 given by (4.65) coincide. Moreover, for r = 0,
the backward differential equation (4.57)is the same as [8, Eq. (4.13)]
5. Conclusion
In this paper, we use a general maximum principle for Markov regime-switching forward-
backward stochastic differential equation to study optimal strategies for stochastic differential
games. The proposed model covers the model uncertainty in [1, 8, 10, 12, 16]. The results
obtained are applied to study two problems: First, we study robust utility maximization under
relative entropy penalization. We show that the value function in this case is described by a
quadratic backward stochastic differential equation. Second, we study a problem of optimal
investment of an insurance company under model uncertainty. This can be formulated as
a two-player, zero-sum, stochastic differential games between the market and the insurance
company, where the market controls the mean relative growth rate of the risky asset and the
company controls the investment. We find “closed form” solutions of the optimal strategies
of the insurance company and the market, when the utility is of exponential type and the
Markov chain has two states.
Optimal control for delayed systems has received attention recently, due to the memory
dependence of some processes. In this situation, the dynamic at the present time t does not
only depend on the situation at time t but also on a finite part of their past history. Extension
of the present work to the delayed case could be of interest. Such results were derived in [15],
in the case of no regime-switching.
Appendix A.
Proof of Theorem 3.1. Let show that J1(u1, û2, en) ≤ J1(û1, û2, en) for all û1 ∈ A1. Fix u1 ∈
A1, then, we have
J1(u1, û2, en)− J1(û1, û2, en) = I1 + I2 + I3, (A.1)
where
I1 =E
[ ∫ T
0
{
f1(t,X(t), α(t), Y (t), u(t)) − f1(t, X̂(t), α(t), û(t))
}
dt
]
, (A.2)
I2 =E
[
ϕ1(X(T ), α(T )) − ϕ1(X̂(T ), α(T ))
]
, (A.3)
I3 =E
[
ψ1(Y1(0)) − ψ1(Ŷ1(0))
]
. (A.4)
By the definition of H1, we get
I1 =E
[ ∫ T
0
{
H1(t, u(t)) − Ĥ1(t, û(t))− Â1(t)(g1(t)− ĝ1(t)) − p̂1(t)(b(t)− b̂(t))
− q̂1(t)(σ(t) − σ̂(t))−
∫
R0
r̂1(t, ζ)(γ(t, ζ) − γ̂(t, ζ))να( dζ)
−
D∑
j=1
ŵ1
j(t)(ηj(t)− η̂j(t))λj(t)
}
dt
]
. (A.5)
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By concavity of ϕ1 in x, Itoˆ formula, and (3.3) we have
I2 ≤E
[∂ϕ1
∂x
(X̂(T ), α(T ))(X(T ) − X̂(T ))
]
=E
[
p̂1(T )(X(T ) − X̂(T ))
]
− E
[
Â1(T )
∂h1
∂x
(X̂(T ), α(T ))(X(T ) − X̂(T ))
]
=E
[ ∫ T
0
p̂1(t)(dX(t) − dX̂(t)) +
∫ T
0
(X(t−)− X̂(t−)) dp̂1(t) +
∫ T
0
(σ(t)− σ̂(t))q̂1(t) dt
+
∫ T
0
∫
R0
(γ(t)− γ̂(t))r̂1(t, ζ)να(dζ) dt+
∫ T
0
D∑
j=1
ŵ1
j(t)(ηj(t)− η̂j(t))λj(t) dt
]
−E
[
Â1(T )
∂h1
∂x
(X̂(T ), α(T ))(X(T ) − X̂(T ))
]
=E
[ ∫ T
0
p̂1(t)(b(t) − b̂(t)) dt+
∫ T
0
(X(t−)− X̂(t−))
(
−
∂Ĥ1
∂x
(t)
)
dt+
∫ T
0
(σ(t)− σ̂(t))q̂(t) dt
+
∫ T
0
∫
R0
(γ(t)− γ̂(t))r̂1(t, ζ)να(dζ) dt+
∫ T
0
D∑
j=1
ŵ1
j(t)(ηj(t)− η̂j(t))λj(t) dt
]
−E
[
Â1(T )
∂h1
∂x
(X̂(T ), α(T ))(X(T ) − X̂(T ))
]
. (A.6)
By concavity of ψ1, h1, Itoˆ formula, (2.7) and (3.2), we get
I3 ≤E
[
ψ′1(Ŷ1(0))(Y1(0)− Ŷ1(0))
]
=E
[
Â1(0)(Y1(0)− Ŷ1(0))
]
=E
[
Â1(T )(Y (T )− Ŷ1(T ))
]
− E
[ ∫ T
0
Â1(t)( dY1(t)− dŶ1(t))
+
∫ T
0
(Y1(t
−)− Ŷ1(t
−)) dÂ1(t) +
∫ T
0
(Z1(t)− Ẑ1(t))
∂Ĥ1
∂z
(t) dt
+
∫ T
0
∫
R0
(K1(t, ζ)− K̂1(t, ζ))∇kĤ1(t, ζ)να( dζ) dt+
∫ T
0
D∑
j=1
∂Ĥ1
∂vj
(t)(V j1 (t)− V̂
j
1 (t))λj(t) dt
]
=E
[
Â1(T ){h1(X(T ), α(T )) − h1(X̂(T ), α(T ))}
]
− E
[ ∫ T
0
∂Ĥ1
∂y
(t)(Y1(t)− Ŷ1(t)) dt
+
∫ T
0
Â1(t)(−g(t) + ĝ(t)) dt+
∫ T
0
(Z(t)− Ẑ(t))
∂Ĥ
∂z
(t) dt
+
∫ T
0
∫
R0
(K1(t, ζ)− K̂1(t, ζ))∇kĤ1(t, ζ)να(dζ) dt+
∫ T
0
D∑
j=1
∂Ĥ1
∂vj
(t)(V j1 (t)− V̂
j
1 (t))λj(t) dt
]
.
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Hence we get
I3 ≤E
[
Â1(T )
∂h1
∂x
(X̂(T ), α(T ))(X(T ) − X̂(T ))
]
− E
[ ∫ T
0
∂Ĥ1
∂y
(t)(Y1(t)− Ŷ1(t)) dt
+
∫ T
0
Â1(t)(−g(t) + ĝ1(t)) dt+
∫ T
0
(Z1(t)− Ẑ1(t))
∂Ĥ1
∂z
(t) dt (A.7)
+
∫ T
0
∫
R0
(K1(t, ζ)− K̂1(t, ζ))∇kĤ1(t, ζ)να(dζ) dt+
∫ T
0
D∑
j=1
∂Ĥ1
∂vj
(t)(V j1 (t)− V̂
j
1 (t))λj(t) dt
]
.
Summing (A.5)-(A.7) up, we have
I1 + I2 + I3 ≤E
[ ∫ T
0
{
H1(t, u(t))− Ĥ1(t, û(t))−
∂Ĥ1
∂x
(t)(X(t) − X̂(t)) −
∂Ĥ1
∂y
(t)(Y1(t)− Ŷ1(t))
+
∫
R0
(K1(t, ζ)− K̂1(t, ζ))∇kĤ1(t, ζ)να(dζ) dt
+
D∑
j=1
∂Ĥ1
∂vj
(t)(V j1 (t)− V̂
j
1 (t))λj(t)
}
dt
]
. (A.8)
One can show, using the same arguments in [11] that, the right hand side of (A.8) is non-
positive. For sake of completeness we shall give the details here. Fix t ∈ [0, T ]. Since
H˜1(x, y, z, k, v) is concave, it follows by the standard hyperplane argument (see e.g [18, Chap-
ter 5, Section 23]) that there exists a subgradient d = (d1, d2, d3, d4(·), d5) ∈ R
3 ×R × R for
H˜1(x, y, z, k, v) at x = X̂(t), y = Ŷ1(t), z = Ẑ1(t), k = K̂1(t, ·), v = V̂1(t) such that if we
define
i1(x, y, z, k, v) :=H˜1(x, y, z, k, v) − Ĥ1(t)− d1(x− X̂(t))− d2(y − Ŷ1(t))− d3(z − Ẑ1(t))
−
∫
R0
d4(ζ)(k(ζ) − K̂1(t, ζ))να(dζ)−
D∑
j=1
d
j
5(V
j
1 (t)− V̂
j
1 (t))λj(t). (A.9)
Then i(x, y, z, k, v) ≤ 0 for all x, y, z, k, v.
Furthermore, we clearly have i(X̂(t), Ŷ1(t), Ẑ1(t), K̂1(t, ·), V̂1(t)). It follows that,
d1 =
∂H˜1
∂x
(X̂(t), Ŷ1(t), Ẑ1(t), K̂1(t, ·), V̂1(t)),
d2 =
∂H˜1
∂y
(X̂(t), Ŷ1(t), Ẑ1(t), K̂1(t, ·), V̂1(t)),
d3 =
∂H˜1
∂z
(X̂(t), Ŷ1(t), Ẑ1(t), K̂1(t, ·), V̂1(t)),
d4 = ∇kH˜1(X̂(t), Ŷ1(t), Ẑ1(t), K̂1(t, ·), V̂1(t)),
d
j
5 =
∂H˜1
∂vj
(X̂(t), Ŷ1(t), Ẑ1(t), K̂1(t, ·), V̂1(t)).
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Combining this with (A.8), and using the concavity of H˜1, we conclude that
J1(u1, û2, ei) ≤ J1(û1, û2, ei) for all u1 ∈ A1. In a similar way, one can show that
J2(û1, u2, ei) ≤ J2(û1, û2, ei) for all u2 ∈ A2. This completed the proof. 
Proof of Theorem 3.5. We have that
d
dℓ
J
(u1+ℓβ1,u2)
1 (t)
∣∣∣
ℓ=0
=E
[ ∫ T
0
{∂f1
∂x
(t)X1(t) +
∂f1
∂u1
(t)β1(t)
}
dt+
∂ϕ1
∂x
(X(u1,u2)(T ), α(T ))X1(T ) + ψ
′
1(Y1(0))y1(0)
]
=J1 + J2 + J3, (A.10)
with
J1 =E
[ ∫ T
0
{∂f1
∂x
(t)X1(t) +
∂f1
∂u1
(t)β1(t)
}
dt
]
,
J2 =E
[∂ϕ1
∂x
(X(u1,u2)(T ), α(T ))X1(T )
]
,
J3 =E
[
ψ′1(Y10))y1(0)
]
.
By Itoˆ’s formula, (3.3), (3.12) and (3.14), we have
J2 =E
[∂ϕ1
∂x
(X(u1,u2)(T ), α(T ))X1(T )
]
(A.11)
=E
[
p1(T )X(T )
]
− E
[∂h1
∂x
(X(u1,u2)(T ), α(T ))A1(T )X1(T )
]
=E
[ ∫ T
0
{
p1(t)
( ∂b
∂x
(t)X1(t) +
∂b
∂u1
(t)β1(t)
)
−X1(t)
∂H1
∂x
(t)
+ q1(t)
(∂σ
∂x
(t)X1(t) +
∂σ
∂u1
(t)β1(t)
)
+
∫
R0
r1(t, ζ)
(∂γ
∂x
(t, ζ)X1(t) +
∂γ
∂u1
(t, ζ)β1(t)
)
να(dζ)
+
D∑
j=1
w
j
1(t)
(∂ηj
∂x
(t)X1(t)−
∂ηj
∂u1
(t)β1(t)
)
λj(t)
}
dt
]
− E
[∂h1
∂x
(X(u1,u2)(T ), α(T ))A1(T )X1(T )
]]
.
Applying once more the Itoˆ’s formula and using (3.13) and (3.15), we get
J3 =E
[
ψ′1(Y (0))y1(0)
]
= E
[
A(0)y1(0)
]
=E
[
A1(T )y1(T )
]
− E
[ ∫ T
0
{
A1(t
−) dy1(t) + y1(t
−) dA1(t) +
∂H1
∂z
(t)z1(t) dt
+
∫
R0
∇kH1(t, ζ)k1(t, ζ)να(dζ) dt+
D∑
j=1
∂H1
∂v
j
1
(t)vj1(t)λj(t) dt
}]
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=E
[∂h1
∂x
(X(u1,u2)(T ), α(T ))X1(T )
]
+ E
[ ∫ T
0
{
A1(t)
(∂g1
∂x
(t)x1(t) +
∂g1
∂y
(t)y1(t)
+
∂g1
∂z
(t)z1(t) +
∫
R0
∇kg1(t, ζ)k1(t, ζ)να(dζ) +
D∑
j=1
∂g1
∂vj
(t)vj1(t)λj(t)
+
∂g1
∂u1
(t)β1(t)
)
−
∂H1
∂y
(t)y1(t)−
∂H1
∂z
(t)z1(t)−
∫
R0
∇kH1(t, ζ)k1(t, ζ)να(dζ)
−
D∑
j=1
∂H1
∂vj
(t)vj1(t)λj(t)
}
dt
]
. (A.12)
Substituting (A.11) and (A.12) into (A.10), we get
d
dℓ
J
(u1+ℓβ1,u2)
1 (t)
∣∣∣
ℓ=0
=E
[ ∫ T
0
X1(t)
{∂f1
∂x
(t) +A1(t)
∂g1
∂x
(t) + p1(t)
∂b
∂x
(t) + q1(t)
∂σ
∂x
(t) +
∫
R0
r1(t, ζ)
∂γ
∂x
(t, ζ)να(dζ)
+
D∑
j=1
w
j
1(t)
∂ηj
∂x
(t)λj(t)−
∂H1
∂x
(t)
}
dt
]
+E
[ ∫ T
0
y1(t)
{∂f1
∂y
(t) +A1(t)
∂g1
∂y
(t)−
∂H1
∂y
(t)
}
dt
]
+ E
[ ∫ T
0
z1(t)
{∂f1
∂z
(t) +A1(t)
∂g1
∂z
(t)−
∂H1
∂z
(t)
}
dt
]
+ E
[ ∫ T
0
∫
R0
k1(t, ζ)
{
∇kf1(t, ζ) +A1(t)∇kg1(t, ζ)−∇kH1(t, ζ)
}
να(dζ)dt
+ E
[ ∫ T
0
D∑
j=1
v
j
1(t)
{∂f1
∂vj
(t) +A1(t)
∂g
∂vj
(t)−
∂H
∂vj
(t)
}
dt
]
+ E
[ ∫ T
0
β1(t)
{∂f1
∂u1
(t) +A1(t)
∂g1
∂u1
(t) +
∂b
∂u1
(t) +
∂σ
∂u1
(t)
+
∫
R0
r1(t, ζ)
∂γ
∂u1
(t, ζ)να(dζ) +
D∑
j=1
w
j
1(t)
∂ηj
∂u1
(t)λj(t)
}
dt
]
. (A.13)
By the definition of H1, the coefficients of the processes X1(t), y1(t), z1(t), k1(t, ζ) and
v
j
1(t), j = 1, . . . ,D, are all equal to zero in (A.13). We conclude that
d
dℓ
J
(u1+ℓβ1,u2)
1 (t)
∣∣∣
ℓ=0
=E
[ ∫ T
0
∂H1
∂u1
(t)β1(t) dt
]
=E
[ ∫ T
0
E
[∂H1
∂u1
(t)β1(t)
∣∣∣E(1)t ] dt]. (A.14)
Hence,
d
dℓ
J
(u1+ℓβ1,u2)
1 (t)
∣∣∣
ℓ=0
= 0 for all bounded β1 ∈ A1 implies that the same holds in
particular for β1 ∈ A1 of the form
β1(t) = β1(t, ω) = θ1(ω)ξ[t0,T ](t), t ∈ [0, T ]
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for a fix t0 ∈ [0, T ), where θ1(ω) is a bounded E
(1)
t0
-measurable random variable. Therefore
E
[ ∫ T
t0
E
[∂H1
∂u1
(t)
∣∣∣E(1)t ]θ1 dt] = 0. (A.15)
Differentiating with respect to t0, we have
E
[∂H1
∂u1
(t0) θ1
]
= 0 for a.a., t0. (A.16)
Since the equality is true for all bounded E
(1)
t0
-measurable random variables θ1, we have
E
[∂H1
∂u1
(t0)|E
(1)
t0
]
= 0 for a.a., t0 ∈ [0, T ]. (A.17)
A similar argument gives that
E
[∂H2
∂u2
(t0)|E
(2)
t0
]
= 0 for a.a., t0 ∈ [0, T ],
under the condition that
d
ds
J (u1,u2+ℓβ2)(t)
∣∣∣
ℓ=0
= 0 for all bounded β2 ∈ A2.
This shows that (1) ⇒ (2).
Conversely, using the fact that every bounded βi ∈ Ai can be approximated by a linear
combinations of controls βi(t) of the form (3.11), the above argument can be reversed to show
that (2) ⇒ (1). 
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